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RECENT CASES
RECENT CASES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - DUE PROCESS OF LAW - ADMISSIBILITY OF BLOOD
SAMPLE OBTAINED FROM AN UNCONSCIOUS PERSON. - Petitioner was convicted
of involuntary manslaughter as a result of an automobile collision which killed
three occupants in the other car and seriously injured the petitioner. A
physician, at the request of a state patrolman, withdrew a sample of blood
from the petitioner while he was unconscious. Subsequent laboratory analysis
disclosed that the blood contained .17 per cent alcohol. Petitioner, after having
been denied habeas corpus by the Supreme Court of New Mexico, obtained
a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court where he contended
that his conviction, based as it was on the involuntary blood test, deprived
him of his liberty without due process of law as guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment. The Court held that the results of a blood test, withdrawn from
the petitioner while unconscious, were admissible as evidence and did not
violate the requirement of due process of law. Chief Justice Warren, Justices
Douglas and Black dissented. Breithaupt v. Abram, 77 S.Ct. 408 (1957).
Evidence secured by federal agents in violation of the Constitution is in-
admissible in federal courts.' Since the first ten amendments to the United
States Constitution have no bearing on the states, they are bound only by
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment,2 thus such evidence is
admissible if obtained by state officers. 3 It is generally recognized that the
accused can consent to various tests and thereby waive his constitutional
rights;4 but the admissibility of evidence obtained from an accused while
unconscious is unsettled. 5
The majority of the states are in accord with the common law rule which
states that illegally obtained evidence is admissible.e The injured party's only
recourse is a tort action against the wrongdoer. 7 It is an assault and battery
to subject a person to a blood test against his will, and it is also an invasion
1. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
2. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 114 (1908). In Jackman v. Rosenbaum, 260
U.S. 22 (1922) the Court held that if a practice is of ancient standing in a state, that is
a reason for holding it unaffected by the 14th amendment. In Miller v. United States,
50 F.2d 505 (3d Cir. 1931) the court stated that the protection against unreasonable
search and seizures afforded by the 4th amendment is not directed to the individual mis-
conduct of state officers.
3. Compare Willis v. United States, 85 F.Supp. 745 (S.D. Cal. 1949) with In Re
Guzzardi, 84 F.Supp. 294 (N.D. Tex. 1949).
4. E.g., Piester v.State, 161 Tex. Crim. R 436, 277 S.W.2d 723 (1955); Brown v.
State, 156 Tex. Crim. R 144, 240 S.W.2d 310 (1951).
5. State v. Weltha, 228 Ia. 519, 292 N.W. 148 (1940) (Such evidence was inad-
missible). Accord, State v. Kroening, 274 Wis. 266, 79 N.W.2d 810 (1956). Contra,
People v. Haeussler, 41 Cal.2d 252, 260 P.2d 8 (1953), cert. denied, 247 U.S. 931
(1954).
6. Wigmore, Evidence § 2183 (3d ed., 1940).
7. Nueslein v. District of Columbia, 115 F.2d 690, 695 (D.C. Cir. 1940). But to
follow this procedure means delay, expense, unwanted publicity and to the non-legal
mind this affords no remedy to one whose security has already been violated and is al-
ready convicted. Furthermore, research denotes very few have sought this redress; fewer
still have been satisfied. However, subsection c of rule 25 of the Uniform Rules of Evi-
dence is in accordance with the common law rule. It states, "no person has a privilege to
refuse to furnish or to permit the taking of samples of body fluids or substances for
analysis."
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of the right of privacy.8 At present, many states, including North Dakota,
have passed legislation which limits the courts and law enforcement agencies
in procurring evidence by use of chemical tests without consent.9
The instant case held that the absence of conscious consent, without more,
does not render the taking of fluid a violation of a constitutional right. 1°
In Rochin v. California"l the Court would not sanction the use of evidence
procurred by forcibly pumping the stomach of the accused. The Court stated
that this procedure violated the due process clause as it "shocks the cons-
cience of the courts and is bound to offend even hardened sensibilities". The
dissent in the instant case points out that in both the Rochin case and the
instant case evidence which had been obtained from the accused involuntarily
was used to convict him. The dissenting Justices refuse to distinguish between
involuntary extraction of: words from the lips of the accused, contents of
his stomach, and fluids of his body, when the evidence obtained is used
to convict him.
No doubt, it is socially desirable to supress crime, but there is a greater
social need the law shall not be flouted by enforcement agencies. 12 It is
submitted that the majority decision in the instant case places undue emphasis
on the needs of speedy and efficient law enforcement at the expense of per-
sonal integrity and other constitutional guarantees.
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DAMAGES - INADEQUATE AND EXCESSIVE - ADDITUR. - Plaintiff, a guest,
sued his host and the driver of another automobile for injuries sustained in
an automobile accident. The trial judge denied plaintiff's motion for a new
trial on the condition that the defendants consent to an increase in the jury's
verdict from $3,000 to $9,830.92. The defendants consented to the "additur"
and the plaintiff appealed from the resulting order of the trial court. The
Supreme Court of Minnesota, in affinning the lower court's decision, held
8. Bednarik v. Bednarik, 18 N.J.Misc. 633, 16 A.2d 80 (1940). This case repre-
sents very sound logic and should he considered in future litigation of this type, however,
the case was over-ruled in Cortese v. Cortese, 10 N.J.Super. 152, 76 A.2d 717 (1950).
Justice Douglas in Rochin v. Calif., 342 U.S. 165, 179 (1952) (concurring opinion)
stated that ". . . words taken from his lips, capsules taken from his stomach and blood
taken from his veins are all inadmissible provided they are taken from him without his
consent."
9. See N.D. Rev. Code § 39-0801 (1953 Supp.). However, in State v. Severson, 75
N.W.2d 316 (N.D. 1956) the court held that evidence of refusal of defendants to take
blood test is inadmissible.
10. Still, the courts do protect certain fundamental rights and will not permit articles
to be introduced in evidence which have been obtained without a valid search war-
rant, United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948), nor do they permit the use of in-
voluntary confessions, Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936), McNabb v. United
States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
11. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
12. People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926). In Watts v. Indiana, 338
U.S. 49 (1949), the Court pointed out that society carries the burden of proving its
charge against the accused. Justice Jackson in United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581,
595 (1949) stated in regard to finding incriminating evidence without a search warrant
that, "It is said that if such arrests and searches cannot be made, law enforcement will
be more difficult and uncertain. But the forefathers after consulting the lessons of history,
designed our Constitution to place obstacles in the way of a too permeating police sur-
veillance, which they seemed to think was a greater danger to a free people than the
escape of a few criminals from punishment."
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